The Atlanta Monitor

Longtime readers may remember March 2012, when I pointed out that the US Bureau of Labor Statistics revised upwards significantly Atlanta’s labor data from throughout 2011. Prior to March 2012, Atlanta was still thought to be mired with ongoing job losses.

Metro Atlanta’s total employment estimate was increased by 75,000 jobs. In the world of economic data, this is a startlingly huge revision; it was the biggest piece of economic news the city had been dealt in years.

The BLS data revision changed the trajectory of the metro area. Many of the positive things we’ve seen since then–including a near doubling in the pace of homebuilding, dozens of speculative apartment projects, and even an office development or two–are directly influenced by strong job market data. The effects ripple throughout other areas of the economy, too: more store and restaurants open as a result of stronger job data, and Atlanta properties are targeted for renovation and reinvestment at much faster rates than before.

There’s an element of self-fulfilling prophecy to this, too: all of these new projects that were kickstarted by the BLS data revisions require more workers, which serve to bolster the economy further.

In short, the annual revisions to the local area labor data are extremely important.

What Is Benchmarking?

Throughout the year, the Georgia Department of Labor and the BLS release monthly snapshots of the local labor market. The monthly reports use immediate indicators and surveys to estimate the level of employment. Over time, these methods are prone to under- or over-estimation of job growth, particularly during recessions and recoveries. To correct this, each year the US BLS revises its employment benchmarks: basically, it assesses all of the different indicators of economic activity to completely revise its estimation of what the current employment level is. Then it revises the previous monthly preliminary estimates to make them jive with its best guess at the current labor situation.

(In case you found the above paragraph especially gripping, you can find everything you ever wanted to know about benchmarking, and then some, here.)

In 2011, it turned out the BLS was underestimating job growth to the tune of tens of thousands of jobs–enough to turn the perception of Atlanta in the business community from laggard to a strong performer.

Benchmarking: 2012 Edition

There’s no telling what the folks at the BLS will determine happened in Atlanta last year, of course. But that doesn’t mean we can’t speculate.

One thing looks certain: we won’t get anywhere near as much of a boost as we did in 2011. Throughout 2011, the number of jobs estimated by the payroll job survey (the more important survey) was zilch or negative, while the household survey showed strong gains of about 50,000 jobs. The 2011 benchmark revision showed the household survey was in fact right.

From December 2010 to December 2011 Atlanta added 50,000 household jobs and 35,000 payroll jobs, according to the revised data. From December 2011 to December 2012, Atlanta has added 55,000 household jobs and 37,000 payroll jobs. In other words, the mismatch between the two surveys doesn’t seem to be an issue this year, perhaps indicating the benchmark revisions will be modest.

Nonetheless, the revised data will be one of the most important economic releases of the year for metro Atlanta. Gains or losses on the order of 10,000 jobs–very large, in other words–are entirely possible. We just have to sit back and wait.

The number I’ll be most eagerly looking for is the Revised December 2011 job estimate. The preliminary estimate is 2,371,500 jobs. The revised estimate will use the new benchmark.

Although the date of the new benchmark release is unknown, it could happen as early as Thursday.

As conference re-alignment in college football continues unabated, most recently with the addition of Rutgers and Maryland to the BigTen, creating a chain reaction that sent Louisville to the ACC and caused cascading impacts throughout the lesser conferences, many are wondering what lies ahead for the Southeastern Conference.

Atlanta, until recently the largest city in the SEC’s footprint, has traditionally played host for key matchups throughout the season. Most importantly, the SEC Championship Game, which Atlanta will host Saturday between Georgia and Alabama, is a boon for area restaurants and hotels. Atlanta also hosted the Chick-Fil-A Kickoff games, estimated by GSU researchers to have a $68 million impact on the local economy, and will host the Chick-Fil-A Bowl on New Year’s Eve. Both of these games feature an SEC team.

(There are some other important parts of Atlanta’s college football portfolio I’m ignoring here: namely Georgia Tech and Georgia State, as well as the planned College Football Hall of Fame, which will break ground soon.)

Atlanta’s role as the Birmingham-based SEC’s showdown-town is a coveted one indeed, and the conference has made no indications this will change. But as Atlanta competes with other cities for various college football-related events, maintaining its role as the nexus of college football’s premier conference is important. The SEC will never be second-rate, but other conferences, notably the BigTen, have certain advantages and expansion plans that threaten the SEC’s standing on top of the sport–at least as far as financial prowess is concerned.

The SEC, currently at 14 teams, will likely continue to expand, despite cries that the traditions and history of the conference are being lost. Schedules will be stretched thinner and thinner as the league reaches 16 or 18 teams; top teams from opposite divisions will rarely meet.

There is a better way. One where the SEC can have its cake (the big-money TV contracts expansion can secure) and eat it too (enjoy frequent matchups between top teams and keep its signature rivalries intact).

The system of Promotion and Relegation, most popularly used in European soccer leagues, splits conferences into two (or more) divisions based on the quality of the teams. At the end of each season, the bottom teams from the top division and the top teams from the bottom division switch places for the next season.

How Relegation Could Work in the SEC

Let’s assume the SEC goes to 18 teams by adding UNC, Duke, Virginia, and Virginia Tech. (I know those exact teams aren’t likely; any teams will do.)

First, the most recent year conference records are used to split the 18-team league into two divisions.

Hypothetical 2013 SEC Premier Division:

1. Alabama 7-1
2. Georgia 7-1
3. Florida 7-1
4. Texas A&M 6-2
5. South Carolina 6-2
6. LSU 6-2
7. Vanderbilt 5-3
8. North Carolina 5-3
9. Mississippi State 4-4

Hypothetical 2013 SEC Secondary Division:

1. Virginia Tech 4-4
2. Duke 3-5
3. Mississippi 3-5
4. Missouri 2-6
5. Virginia 2-6
6. Arkansas 2-6
7. Tennessee 1-7
8. Auburn 0-8
9. Kentucky 0-8

With the two divisions set, a league schedule where teams play all other teams in their division (8 games) plus one cross-division game (1 game) would be established.

Rivalries could be protected through a priority list of the league’s strongest rivalries. Alabama – Auburn would likely top such a list, and would thus be protected regardless of whether the teams play in the same division. Likewise Mississippi State – Mississippi, Georgia – Florida, Virginia – Virginia Tech, Arkansas – Texas A&M, and North Carolina – Duke. Team’s secondary rivalries, such as Arkansas – LSU, South Carolina – Tennessee, and Georgia – Auburn, would be preserved in the event that both teams’ primary rivalries are within their own division. This would ensure all primary rivalries are played every year, and secondary rivalries are played most years.

Given the above schedules, you would likely see cross division games including Alabama – Auburn, Texas A&M – Arkansas, Vanderbilt – Tennessee, UNC – Duke, and Mississippi – Mississippi State.

The Advantages of Relegation

• TV Money. Currently, top SEC programs are watered down both by traditionally weaker programs such as Kentucky, as well as historically-strong programs on weak years, such as Auburn. This system would guarantee that most top teams would play each other every year. This year, the top six teams of the SEC–collectively undefeated–played 8 games with each other. Under the relegation system, the teams would have played 15 games. CBS and ESPN would have their pick of marquee matchups week after week, and contracts could be adjusted accordingly.
• Similar to the above, the fan interest of seeing top teams frequently match up against one another would be extraordinary.
• Weaker teams from the Secondary Division would have a chance to achieve bowl-eligibility, which requires 6 wins under current NCAA rules. Attempting to balance divisions leaves very long periods of time between winning seasons for teams like Kentucky.
• The SEC could potentially gain even more money through relegation and promotion playoff games. For example, the worst Premier Division and best Secondary Division teams would switch places. But the second- and third-worst teams in the Premier Division could have a relegation playoff, where the loser would drop to the Secondary Division. Likewise, the second- and third-best Secondary Division teams would play for the right to ascend to the Premier Division. These games would be in addition to the regular season and would be of tremendous importance to the entire league; ratings and fan interest would be massive. These could be home games or neutral-field games.
• Finding suitable expansion candidates would be much simpler in such a system. The problem with current expansions is that every team has to deliver everything: a storied program that will make solid matchups with existing top teams but won’t impede on existing teams’ turf and won’t bring along any “kid brother” programs (as UNC probably would in the form of Duke). the number of teams meeting all of these requirements is vanishingly small. This problem is obliterated by a relegation system, where a team like Duke could actually play a meaningful role in the conference and not water down the schedules of top teams.
• Pretty much everyone has something to play for in this system, throughout the season. For teams in the Premier Division, each loss significantly increases threat they’ll be relegated to the Secondary Division. For lesser teams, who often have their title hopes dashed at the beginning of the season, the possibility of fighting their way into contention to be promoted, or even play in the SEC Playoffs, would keep fans interested and play inspired.
• Schedules would be incredibly balanced. This year, Florida and Texas A&M fans are rightly upset that Georgia and Alabama managed to win their division crowns playing much easier schedules. With balanced (East/West) divisions and only a couple cross-division games, such complaints have validity. Under a relegation system, there would be no schedule discrepancies anywhere near this scale.

The Disadvantages of Relegation

• In the SEC Premier Division, an undefeated season would be practically impossible, as strength of schedule would be gruesome.
• Teams in the Secondary Division will complain of disadvantages (although they would be benefactors of an extremely large shared-revenue pool). This could be mitigated in several ways. Cross-division games could be held at home stadiums of Secondary Division teams, although undoubtedly big-name teams like Alabama and Georgia will object to fewer home games. If a four-team SEC playoff were allowed by the NCAA, the winner of the Secondary Division could participate as the fourth team.
• Certain rivalries would take a hiatus. Georgia – Auburn and Alabama – Tennessee, for example, would both be forestalled until certain teams switched divisions.
• There would be an increased number of rematches. Both the relegation and the promotion playoffs would be a rematches, as would one or more playoff games for the conference title. One potential solution could be only playing six teams within your division and increasing the number of cross-division games up to three (similar to the BigTen format prior to its Nebraska expansion). In this schedule, rematches are still possible, but will occur less often.

In our view, the pros solidly outweigh the cons. The current East-West division setup is strained at 14 teams, with only one rotating cross-division rival, and would scarcely function at 16. At 18 teams, it would be impossible to maintain.

The total number of postseason matchups could increase, under this proposal, from 1 to 5. Some of these matchups could be played in neutral locations, possibly in Atlanta.

This is no haphazard, piecemeal addition of teams. This proposal would cement the SEC’s position as the premier college football conference moving forward, and at the same time cement Atlanta’s position as the center of the college football world.

This is Part Three of a three part series on the Reversible Super Arterial Tollway. Part One Part Two

Now that I’ve identified a number of corridors that are candidates for Reversible Super Arterial Tollways (RSATs), let’s talk dollars and cents.

Cost per Mile: I’ve assumed here that a construction cost of $25 million to $50 million per mile is in effect for Reversible Super Arterial Tollways. For Super Arterial Tollways, a cost of $50 million/mile is assumed. Cost assumptions can be seen below.

Volume Estimates: A big part of how viable these roadways are is the number of vehicles paying the tolls. I assumed one fourth of maximum annual average daily traffic (AADT) along a corridor will use the RSAT; I assumed one-third of maximum AADT along a corridor will use a Super Arterial Tollway (which runs in both directions). This is subject to plenty of uncertainty. First, where there’s added capacity, you’ll get added volume. No doubt about it: commuters will shift their behaviors to use that corridor more. But there’s also uncertainty about what percentage will pay the tolls (partially dependent upon the cost of the toll). But, to keep things simple, we’re assuming 25% of current volumes pay tolls on the RSAT, and 33% pay tolls on the Super Arterial Tollway.

Toll Levels: I’ve assumed $0.25/mile is a reasonable average toll level for use of the roads. $0.25 /mile is roughly equivalent to the cost of operating a vehicle that gets 25 miles per gallon (depending on how you calculate it, exactly). As I said earlier, I would advocate variable pricing according to congestion.

Payback Period: To avoid a needlessly complicated discussion of bond financing, I’ve assumed that tolls would finance a construction amount 15 times their annual revenue. This will lead to longer than a 15 year financing period in reality, due in interest payments–perhaps 25 years. Whether politicians want to lift tolls after the payback period ends is beyond the scope of this article.

After you’ve got the above assumptions nailed down, it’s all just number crunching.

According to the calculations, a $0.25/mi average toll would cover 45% of the construction costs of the roadway. It is assumed that a two-lane reversible roadway would be sufficient for SR 74. This project would roughly double capacity in the peak direction.

Tara Boulevard, owing mainly to its sky-high AADT, could have nearly 75% of its construction cost covered by tolls. A three-lane reversible roadway was assumed.

US 78 suffers mainly due to lack of median space, which sends the cost per mile sharply upwards.

Like US 78, Pleasant Hill Road also suffers from a lack of median width. However, the important intangible benefit of connecting two limited access roadways is outside of this discussion.

Peachtree Parkway, north of Peachtree Industrial Blvd, fares a bit better than US 78 and Pleasant Hill Road, mainly due to the presence of a small median.

The SR 92 Super Arterial is an extremely large project, and would be transformative for the areas it serves. However, the massive length causes a huge price tag: half a billion dollars.

Cobb Parkway has low toll coverage, but use could increase substantially as commuters seek to avoid the congested I-75 corridor.

Adding up the costs above, the whole system could be built out for about $1.2 billion in hard costs. With this level of investment, commuters across metro Atlanta would be much better served by the network of arterial roadways than they are now.

Cost Assumptions

I rely on two data points for construction cost estimates. First is the SR 618 toll project in Tampa, which was constructed in 2004 for about $50 million/mile. The project is fully-elevated because no median width existed. The project is three lanes, while many of these corridors could get by with two. The project is in a mix of urban and suburban areas, while these projects are completely suburban. A cost considerably lower than $50 million/mile should be considered for a two-lane RSAT that is mainly built within existing median width, minimizing the need for structures.

The second data point is the cost estimate to convert Tara Boulevard into a Super Arterial, used during the TSPOLST: also at $50 million/mile. Notably, this is for a two-way Super Arterial. A cost considerably lower should be assumed for a RSAT (partly because of increased ability to use median width instead of acquiring costly right of way).

For a two lane RSAT on an existing highway with a wide median, a cost of $25 million/mile is assumed.

For a third lane, an extra $5 million/mile is added.

When a small median exists, an extra $15 million/mile is added.

When no median exists, an extra $25 million/mile is added.

For a full-fledged Super Arterial, the Tara Boulevard estimate is used: $50 million/mile.

This is Part Two of a three-part series on the Reversible Super Arterial Roadway. Part One Part Three

Yesterday’s post discussed what I believe to be a potential solution for some of metro Atlanta’s traffic issues: the Reversible Super Arterial Roadway (RSAT). The idea is to run barrier-separated, reversible toll lanes down the median of suburban arterial roadways–think mini-Peachtree Industrial Boulevards throughout the metro. Given Atlanta’s relatively modest interstate network, expansion of limited access roadways along existing arterial roads is a potential game-changer.

So let’s talk details. First, I’ll talk about where might it work best. Then, in the next post, I’ll provide some conceptual cost estimates for these roadways and assess the ability of tolls to offset construction costs.

Optimal Corridors for RSATs

A good candidate corridor for RSAT implementation would have the following characteristics:

1. Has a predictable flow of commuter traffic going in one direction in the morning, and the other direction in the evening.
2. Handles at least 25,000 vehicles per day.
3. Serves a developed area with sparse interstate access.
4. Has a right-of-way with existing, unused space, such as an open median.
5. Connects to an existing limited-access roadway.

We’ve excluded from consideration any roads that pass through historic downtown areas, as that ought to be a nonstarter.

So let’s go over a few projects.

SR 74 in Fulton & Fayette Counties (Peachtree City & Tyrone)

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Check.
2. Traffic volume: 33,240 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? Check.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Check.

As I described yesterday, SR 74 looks pretty much ideal for a starter project.

Tara Boulevard in Clayton County

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Mostly. Commuter traffic tends to head north in the morning and south in the evening, but a significant amount of local traffic plies the road as well.
2. Traffic volume: 65,430 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? Check.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Check.

Tara Boulevard also appears to be a strong candidate.

US 78 in Gwinnett County (Snellville & Lilburn)

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Mostly. Commuter traffic tends to head into town in the morning and away in the evening, but a significant amount of local traffic plies the road as well.
2. Traffic volume: 53,990 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? No. Right of way is constrained.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Check.

US 78 seems like a so-so candidate. Lack of right of way would be an implementation challenge, as the road is built out to full width already.

Pleasant Hill Road in Gwinnett County (Between Ronald Reagan Pky and I-85)

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Mostly. Commuter traffic tends to head towards the interstate in the morning and away in the evening, but a significant amount of local traffic plies the road as well.
2. Traffic volume: 53,320 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? No. Right of way is constrained.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Double-check. This would connect two limited access roadways, greatly improving mobility for people who live along the corridor.

Pleasant Hill Road seems like a solid candidate. It suffers from some of the same right-of-way shortfalls as US 78, but connection to Ronald Reagan Pky is a big plus: commuters throughout central Gwinnett could much more easily make it to the major employment centers along the top end of 285 if this connection were in place.

Peachtree Parkway in Gwinnett & Fulton Counties

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Check.
2. Traffic volume: 46,650 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? Check.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Check–it connects right into Peachtree Industrial.

Like SR 74, Peachtree Parkway looks pretty much ideal for RSAT implementation.

SR 92 (Alabama Road) in Cherokee, Cobb, and Fulton Counties

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Nope.
2. Traffic volume: Up to 68,210 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? In places, yes.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Yes, connects with I-75, I-575, and GA 400.

SR 92 is a tricky case. It handles an array of commuters going between different places. As such, no clear directional traffic flows could be established. This seems like a much better candidate for a normal (non-reversible) tolled Super Arterial. This could substantially relieve the top-end of 285, as well as roads leading to it.

Cobb Parkway (US 41) in Cobb County (Canton Road Connector to Kennesaw)

1. Predictable flow of commuter traffic? Not really.
2. Traffic volume: 38,690 vehicles per day.
3. Developed area without interstate access? Check.
4. Has open median? Check.
5. Connects to existing limited-access roadway? Yes, connects with the Canton Road Connector for I-75 access.

Cobb Parkway appears to be another road where a normal tolled-Super Arterial would work best, since plenty of traffic flows in both directions throughout the day, and traffic can move frustratingly slowly even during off-peak times. This would serve as a major reliever to I-75, which lies between one and three miles to the north of the roadway. Extensions southward to I-285 could be considered, but there is less room along the right-of-way in this area, and I-75 is close by. Still, this could substantially relieve congestion at the I-75/I-285 interchange.

Since everybody loves maps, here’s a map of all of the corridors mentioned in the above article:

Like I said earlier, tomorrow I’ll look at the ability of tolls to offset development costs on these particular routes.

Any suggestions about additional corridors that should be studied?

This is Part One of a three-part series on the Reversible Super Arterial Tollway. Part Two Part Three

Given the failure of metro Atlanta’s transportation referendum, and all the subsequent talk of a “Plan B”, I’m going to throw in some of my own suggestions on what sort of investments Atlanta can make in order to tackle its seemingly intractable traffic quagmire.

Peachtree Industrial Boulevard, north of I-285, is perhaps Atlanta’s most underrated road. According to GDOT data, the Peachtree Industrial handles over 115,000 vehicles per day. This puts it ahead of many of Atlanta’s second-tier interstates. I-985, which connects Atlanta to Gainesville, is just shy of 60,000 vehicles per day in its busiest stretch. No part of I-575 or I-675 exceeds 100,000 vehicles per day. Peachtree Industrial even edges out traffic volumes at the Georgia 400 toll plaza in Buckhead.

How does Peachtree Industrial do it?

The road is what traffic engineers call a Super Arterial. The road functions as a hybrid between an arterial roadway (meant for handling local traffic–the lanes on either side), and a limited-access roadway (such as an interstate, which can be seen in the middle).

Photo courtesy Google Earth.

If the TSPLOST had passed, Atlanta would have had a second Super Arterial, down on Clayton County’s Tara Boulevard, a densely-developed road that handles 65,000 vehicles per day–a mix of commuters and local traffic.

The Reversible Tollway Concept

Before we delve too deeply into the Super Arterial concept, let’s talk about the latest big solution for Atlanta’s traffic woes: the reversible tollway. I-75 is planned to be to be expanded with completely grade-separated, reversible toll lanes in the middle. The project, which will run from the interchange with I-285 to the 75/575 split, and a ways further up each interstate after the split, will use two main innovations:

1. The variable toll. Tolls will be based on demand, with the goal of keeping traffic moving at a speed of at least 50 mph.
2. The reversible lane. Additional lanes will relieve traffic flows in the peak direction (towards Atlanta during the morning, away from Atlanta during the evening)

We certainly agree this idea is better than traditional freeway expansions. Reversible lanes mean a smaller roadway footprint, and hence lower costs and environmental impacts. Tolls mean lower development costs. And variable pricing means the most time-sensitive traffic gets where it needs to go.

Limitations to the Reversible Toll Lane Concept

But does this best address Atlanta’s traffic needs? I-75 already is, by national standards, extremely wide, with up to 8-lanes on each side. Meanwhile, other cities get by with a more extensive network of more modestly-sized interstates (with, say, three to five lanes on each side). Not only do more people live closer to an interstate in these other cities (such as Nashville, Houston, and Dallas), but they also have more more options to get where they need to go.

Meanwhile, Atlantans gripe that the arterial roadways–the ones that take them from, say, the interstate to the entrance of their neighborhood–are the worst of all. These streets are jammed with commuters and local traffic, all pushing yellow lights and battling their way into double-left turn lanes.

In these sorts of situations, a Peachtree Industrial Boulevard setup would be preferable for commuters, with through traffic and local traffic separated completely.

Introducing the Reversible Super Arterial Tollway (RSAT)

How can we address all of these issues–overburdened interstates, clogged arterials, and ever-shrinking roadway budgets?

Enter the Reversible Super Arterial Tollway (RSAT). This concept takes the two innovations discussed above (reversible, barrier-separated lanes; and congestion-variable tolls), and puts them on a Peachtree Industrial Boulevard-style Super Arterial. Two or three barrier-separated lanes will run down the medians of existing arterial roadways, alleviating the peak traffic direction.

Perhaps the perfect application for this sort of roadway is SR 74, down in Fayette County. Every morning, the crush of commuters from Peachtree City and Tyrone pushes the four-lane, median-separated highway far beyond capacity–in the Atlanta-bound lanes, at least. In the afternoon, as the commuters rush home, insufficient southbound capacity on SR 74 backs up traffic onto I-85. Even during off-peak times, the growing number of stoplights along the road makes the drive cumbersome. Simply put, this roadway isn’t equipped to handle the traffic flows of about 35,000 vehicles per day.

In order to improve the situation, two barrier-separated toll lanes running down the median of the road could be built. In the morning, the toll lanes would run northbound, towards Atlanta; in the afternoon, they would be reversed. The original two lanes on either side of the roadway would remain in place, giving drivers the option of not paying the toll.

Advantages of the RSAT Concept

The RSAT concept offers several advantages over the Reversible Toll Lane concept proposed on I-75.

1. Drivers have an incentive to pay the toll–even during off-peak hours. As GDOT quickly learned after implementing HOT (High-Occupancy Toll) lanes on I-85 in Gwinnett County, if there isn’t congestion, drivers aren’t willing to pay much of anything for the privilege of riding in the toll lanes. After all, the normal lanes are flowing freely, so the toll lane offers no obvious benefits. Tolls eventually fell to rock bottom levels during congestion-free periods (a penny per mile); the same outcome is likely on the I-75 project. In the RSAT concept, this isn’t the case: drivers who pay the toll have the added benefit of bypassing all the slower-moving local traffic, not to mention all the stoplights along the road. Drivers get a guaranteed speed-limit drive, and they’ll pay more for that. In some cases, a higher speed limit could be allowed for the RSAT lanes than the general lanes.
2. RSATs spread capacity around, rather than concentrating it on existing corridors. As I-75′s capacity increases as a result of the toll lane project, the arterial roads that feed into it will be burdened with ever-increasing traffic volumes. By developing RSATs to relieve existing interstate corridors, we won’t place further burdens on our already-strained network of feeder roadways and interchanges.
3. RSATs give commuters options. The I-75 toll lane project delivers capacity, but it doesn’t deliver options. Indeed, commuters will depend just as much on I-75 as they ever did in the past. Developing RSATs to relieve interstates will give some commuters a choice of which route to take home, and potentially dodge traffic jams in the process. Ideally, the addition of several RSATs would reduce volumes on major interstate highways.
4. RSATs are built within–and primarily benefit–the existing developed footprint of metro Atlanta. RSATs primarily serve commuters within existing developed areas; putting one on SR 74 or Tara Boulevard wouldn’t be of much use to an 80-mile round trip commuter from the distant exurbs. Meanwhile, interstate widening projects, such as the 2008 widening I-85 in Coweta and Meriwether Counties, mainly help people who commute long distances into metro Atlanta. In other words, the RSAT concept would probably induce less suburban sprawl than expansions of long-distance interstates.
5. Arterials tend to be a lot easier to build on than interstates. Interstate highways tend to be the most expensive roadways to alter. First, a corridor like I-75 is almost completely built-out–there’s no extra width for capacity in most places. Any additional capacity must be built entirely on structures or require realigning the entire interstate: both ruinously expensive options. Second, each time an interstate meets a surface street, it runs into a bridge, a tunnel, or an interchange. Adding new toll lanes nearly always requires the interchange or bridge to be rebuilt, costing tens of millions of dollars for each and every one you encounter. RSATs, instead, could be much simpler to implement.
6. Like the I-75 HOT lane proposal, RSATs don’t cannibalize existing capacity. This proposal avoids the politically-toxic idea of tolling existing capacity.

Are There Any Similar Models?

You might be wondering if I’m completely going out on a limb with this idea. The answer is, perhaps. I know of no project in the United States that’s exactly what I’m describing (feel free to chime in if I’m wrong).

But there is at least something similar: the SR 618 reversible toll lanes in Tampa, Florida. In this project, an existing toll freeway was expanded by adding three reversible, fully-elevated toll lanes in the median. The project runs all the way from downtown Tampa to the suburb of Brandon. The SR 618 project is similar in some ways to the I-75 project, mainly in that it serves an existing limited access road. But, like the RSAT concept, it adds extra capacity to a second-tier, lower-capacity corridor where there is more space for development. The SR 618 project does not feed into a long-distance interstate, either. The elevated portion is 8 miles long, and cost $420 million in the mid-2000s–or roughly $50 million/mile. It carries over 15,000 toll-paying vehicles per day. More information on the project can be found here.

The SR 618 project varies from the RSAT concept in several ways. First, the RSAT concept is strictly for the suburbs, given the hemmed-in nature of urban arterial roads. Second, the RSAT is aimed at arterial roads, rather than expressways. But the SR 618 project has several similar features to the RSAT concept being proposed here.

In the following posts, I’ll describe where I think RSATs ought to be implemented in metro Atlanta, how much we can expect to spend on the system, and the ability of toll collections to offset development costs.

Stay tuned.

As many observers expected, the referendum over a 1% sales tax to fund transportation projects in metro Atlanta failed. The margin of failure was spectacularly high: the tax was shunned by almost two-thirds of voters.

Despite what the national media says over the next few days, it’s important to keep this in perspective. What does the TSPLOST failure mean? What doesn’t it mean?

I won’t offer a huge amount of discussion on the issue. There’s plenty of that across the internet. I’ll make this my only discussion of the TSPLOST:

What the TSPLOST Would Have Been

The TSPLOST would have, critically, provided about $700 million more in annual transportation capital investment funding for the metro Atlanta area. This would roughly double the currently available amount.

Something different absolutely has to happen for the way Atlanta’s infrastructure is funded. This tax would have absolutely been something, and it would have diverted billions towards  worthy projects. For that reason, I sympathized with the supporters and generally hoped for passage (although this blog took no formal stance on the issue).

What the TSPLOST Would Not Have Been

Since the TSPLOST is gone forever, let’s take a moment to examine its weaknesses.

• The Fayette County project list was weak and lopsided. Well over half of the project value funded a politically sensitive East Fayetteville Bypass project and its connection to GA 92, which left Peachtree City feeling slighted. Maybe the tax would have been a net positive for Fayette, maybe not. But it’s hard to argue it would have been a transformative for Fayette.
• The Rockdale and Douglas County lists favored the county seats (Conyers and Douglasville, respectively) too much. Roads to and from the downtown areas received most of the attention while swathes of each county were ignored. It became difficult to ignore the possibility that politicians might be using the project list to build their legacies, instead of taking a narrow goal of eliminating congestion.
• South Gwinnett was almost completely ignored. Again, most projects focused on the county seat, Lawrenceville, despite the large population living along the US 78 corridor.
• Perhaps worst of all, about two-thirds of Cobb County’s share were devoted to an “Enhanced Premium Transit Service” heading from Midtown to Acworth. Nobody could describe exactly what this service would entail or what it would look like. Opponents sniped that it clearly isn’t enough money to get any further north than Cumberland Mall, meaning the vast majority of Cobb’s share would be spent out of county. When projects are as ill-defined as this, it is cause for concern that feasibility issues will sink the project, robbing Cobb of more than half its revenue allocation.
• Likewise, the transit service to Stonecrest simply wasn’t well-funded enough. Full-fledged MARTA service along the corridor was too expensive, but instead of falling back to a less-grandiose but more-feasible form of transport such as commuter rail (via Stone Mountain and Decatur, along CSX tracks), an awkward “I-20 East Corridor Investments” line item was cooked up, with only a fraction of what such a thing would really cost allocated.
• Clayton’s project–turning 5 miles of Tara Boulevard into a “Superarterial” (think Peachtree Industrial Boulevard) was one of the best projects on the list. It would have genuinely benefited the majority of Clayton County. But, in the last phases of cuts, the project was trimmed down to only an awkwardly short 2-mile stretch of road.

Indeed, the passage of the tax may have been better than whatever else will come along. We won’t know what other solutions are brought to the table (if any) for several years, and we’ll never know how some of the open-ended items above would have turned out. But with all of the above flaws, it’s hard to picture the TSPLOST being a game changer.

This is far from a deathblow to Atlanta. Traffic remains on par with many peer cities, according to INRIX. As of June 2012, Atlanta is the 19th most congested city in America, between Houston and Baton Rouge.

The main risks, as I see them, are from a publicity perspective. It’s up to our leaders, now to (1) manage the dialogue about Atlanta in the wake of the TSPLOST failure and (2) put options on the table for the 2013 legislative session.

The ball is on Mayor Reed’s and Governor Deal’s court for the moment. We’ll have to wait and see what happens next.

Amid the economic gloom of 2011, Atlanta-watchers found some measure of respite in Midtown. The district broke ground on a 12-floor dual-branded hotel on 10th street, and two new highrise apartments were announced, just a couple blocks apart from each other. A mile down Ponce, City Hall East was finally being converted to the live/work/play development long envisioned by city leaders.

The Atlanta Business Chronicle proclaimed in June that “Midtown has momentum”, and that “it might be the fastest recovering of all the metro region’s business centers.”

Now, with most of Midtown’s developments off the ground and little appearing to be in the pipeline, it might be Buckhead’s turn in the spotlight.

Boosted by the strongest 2011 office absorption in the metro, a new 10-floor office building will be constructed at 3330 Peachtree Street, one block south of the Buckhead MARTA Station. In the mid-2000s this sort of building would have been nothing to write home about, but in this economic climate it will be one of the highest-profile office projects in the metro.

Although not on the level of Midtown’s new highrises, Buckhead has two substantial apartment complexes under construction, about a mile to the south of 3330 Peachtree Street.

The projects include a 9-floor apartment highrise next to the St. Regis Hotel, and a 5-floor midrise on Pharr Road.

Perhaps biggest development of 2012 came this morning with the announcement that Buckhead Atlanta–a major mixed use project right in between the two above apartment developments–would finally continue after years of inactivity. The project isn’t going to be making any major progress for the time being; instead, OliverMcMillan will start “pre-construction” work–preparation, demolition, and so forth. Still, the project is integral to the landscape of Buckhead Village, and perhaps now there is light at the end of the tunnel.

All of the above projects probably aren’t enough to put Buckhead on top of Midtown, but at least there is a healthy rivalry once again.

Finally, a nugget a couple months ago suggested that a new office tower in Alliance Center was in the works. To date, no further progress or corroborating news is available.

For Atlanta, the 2008 recession and its aftermath have been a humbling experience. Atlanta went from being envied nationwide as a sunbelt boomtown, perpetually in a short list of top-performing cities on a number of metrics, to one of the worst performers in the country and the world. What happened?

To answer this question, we need to look at some long-held assumptions about Atlanta’s growth.

The 2000s: A Lost Decade

As it turns out, Atlanta’s job growth from 2000 through 2008 was far worse than was popularly perceived. Throughout the 2000s Atlanta felt like a boomtown, but some serious cracks were forming in the city’s economic foundation.

The most serious of these was income growth. Unlike most cities, Atlanta actually suffered negative income growth throughout the decade. This wasn’t only true of the recession period. Atlanta’s personal income had been declining spectacularly even during the so-called boom years. Compared to historical rates, much of the job creation was in areas like Leisure & Hospitality and Government–sectors which are less often “basic employment” that generate income from outside of the metro area.

The following chart compares the two previous boom cycles: 1997-1999 and 2004-2006. The chart looks at the percentage of total job growth each sector comprises.

Notice that white-collar Professional & Business Services jobs accounted for a smaller chunk of total job growth from 2004-2006, while Government, Healthcare, and Hospitality had disproportionately large pieces of the pie. During the late nineties, Professional & Business Services accounted for over a quarter of new jobs created; in the 2000s, the sector accounted for barely a fifth. Meanwhile, both Government and Leisure & Hospitality increased to account for about an eighth of new jobs created.

With the complete evaporation of the job market in late 2008 and early 2009, Atlanta’s employment was in free fall. This was particularly true of the sectors that sustained the 2004-2006 boom. By the time the free fall was over, in January 2010, Atlanta had lost a whopping 250,000 jobs compared to its December 2007 peak. January 2010 employment levels were equivalent to those from way back in 2000. The clock had been turned back 10 years.

All of this points to the idea that, for the Atlanta metro, the 2000s were a Lost Decade. Many shimmering glass towers were added to the skyline and the metro added about a million new residents, but the underlying economic strength was not there to sustain it. Atlanta did not perform even on pace with the rest of the country; Atlanta was far below it.

The Road Ahead

As the nationwide economic recovery makes baby steps in the right direction, Atlanta stands at a crossroads: what will the 2010s bring?

There are three main possibilities.

First, Atlanta could simply have a decade of jobless stagnation. All signs were pointing towards this outcome–with employment levels flat over 2011 despite an economic recovery nationwide–until March 2012 revisions to the jobs data changed all that. Although Atlanta seems to be adding jobs at a healthy clip now, this could all change in a heartbeat: indeed, the city remains a matter of years, not months, away from a return to peak employment, even at healthy growth levels. We are far from being out of the woods.

Second, and perhaps more likely, is that Atlanta will continue the trend of the 2000s and have low wage job growth, possibly setting itself up for another epic collapse. To date, there is little evidence of this taking place, but here too there is no reason for smugness. An examination of the 2004-2006 jobs data shows that white collar Professional & Business Services job growth lagged, and was replaced with lower-wage job growth, seemingly without obvious reason:

By 2004, the first year Atlanta managed to add substantial jobs after the 2001 recession, Professional & Business Services hiring was doing fine, although not at levels seen in the 1990s. In the following two years, job growth in this sector halved, even while the rest of the economy was adding jobs at a faster pace than before. Therefore, it seems that another decade of low wage job growth cannot be ruled out.

Only one possibility for the next decade is worth embracing: a return to the high wage job growth and rapid job creation that defined Atlanta in the 1990s. The March 2012 employment revisions are definitely a solid step forward. As I argue, Atlanta is growing in all the right places, at least for the time being. But, with a full recovery so far off, this outcome is far from assured.

Over the coming weeks, I will begin a series that describes five critical risks that could sink Atlanta’s recovery. Any one of these issues has the potential to preclude the third possibility, and instead force Atlanta into the familiar pattern of low (or no) job and wage growth for the foreseeable future.

Stay tuned.